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SRI LANKA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
For millennia, Sri Lanka has been an active partner in world trade. During the
time span of over 400 years of Portuguese, Dutch, and British colonialism which ended
in 1948, the economy of Sri Lanka emerged into a distinct dual economy: the
subsistence domestic agriculture fulfills most of the indigenous consumption needs
while the export-led plantation economy earned the needed foreign exchange to import
other necessary consumer and capital goods. With its strategic location, this island
nation of 18 million people in the Indian ocean which now serves as a trade transit port
between East Asia and Western Europe also enjoyed a comparative advantage in
international trade by maintaining the dual agricultural economy. At the time of
political independence from the British in 1948, more than 80 percent of Sri Lanka’s
GDP consisted of domestic rice and other crop production and the commercial
plantation sector of tea, rubber, and coconut. In the ensuing decades, it is widely
believed that the traditional sector is inefficient and backward while the export sector is
perceived as a modern and efficient operation which has forward and backward
linkages to other industries and services domestically and internationally. Thus, the
commercial export-led agriculture (i.e., estate sector) is in favor among policymakers
not only because it generates foreign exchange, employs a significant portion of the
work force, and contributes to economic growth but is also an elitist form of agriculture
(in association with British) compared to smallholder rice and other crop production.
Over the past 50 years, the dominant development paradigm also advocated that
economic growth can be achieved by increasing the rate of growth of GNP and by
promoting export-led development strategies. With these strategies, it is assumed that
the problems of development and modernization can be overcome by transforming
traditional subsistence societies into modern economies. Among development
economists, Walter Rostow (1960) proved this empirically by demonstrating the stages
of economic growth of the Western development path while Arthur Lewis (1954 and
1955) explored it by absorption of excessive rural labor supply into modem economic
activities in order to achieve a higher rate of growth. Other economists, includingGustav Ranis and John Fei (1964), also viewed the concept of rural labor surplus as an
inherent problem of unemployment and economic growth. Ragnar Nurkse (1953)
described that the “vicious circles” are an inhibited factor in traditionally rigid societies
like Sri Lanka and prescribed that they must be broken by a “big push” from foreign
investment and technology to achieve a higher level of economic growth.
In the 1950s and 196Os, economic growth was defined by the rate of GNP, not by
the GNP per capita change. It was much later the variant of per capita was captured as
an economic indicator.The notions of poverty and income distribution were not part of
this economic thinking at all. The Britton Woods Institutions (i.e., the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund) for these years widely shared the economic growth
paradigm and advocated free market economics as a mechanism for economic
development. With the highly emphasized success of the East Asian countries, Sri
Lanka was then convinced to adopt such open market policies and to liberalize trade
and foreign exchange regimes in 1977. Sri Lanka was the first country to adopt such
policies among other SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation)
countries of Bangladesh, India, Maldives Islands, Nepal, and Pakistan. It was a marked
departure from the previous policies of an inward-looking, self-sufficient, state-led
import substitution approach to development in Sri Lanka as well as in the South Asian
region.
During the 1970-77 period, the explicit goal of the socialist government was to
achieve economic equity and social justice. The Land Reform Laws of 1972 enforced a
ceiling on private rice land holding at 25 acres (10 hectares) and mixed holding at 50
acres (20 hectares) where rice-paddy and other crops were grown. As a result of this
legislation, the Land Reform Commission acquired 560,000 acres. In the second round
of the land reform policy in 1975, the government nationalized all estates (tea, rubber,
and coconut) from large private companies and kept a maximum ownership at a 50 acre
ceiling. From 1972 to 1975, more than 60 percent of perennial tree crop lands were
transferred to public ownership. While the government owned and managed the
nationalized estates exclusively by two large public corporations (the Janatha Estates
2Development Board, JEBD and the Sri Lanka State Plantation Corporation, SLSPC),
about 115,000 acres of acquired lands (about 12 percent) were distributed in small plots
to about 350,000 families who were landless or poor. The multi-purpose massive
Mahaveli River Development Program (similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority in the
United States) was then planned to generate electricity, to irrigate paddy lands, and to
achieve a self sufficiency in rice production. To protect local small farmers, rice import
restrictions were enforced. A dual foreign exchange system was also introduced to
discourage import with an over-valued exchange rate and to encourage export with an
under-valued foreign exchange rate. An aggressive government involvement in
economic and trade affairs was the norm during this period. The annual GDP per
capita during 1970-77 grew only by 2.4 percent compared to 5.3 percent during the
relatively open economic regime in 1965-70.
With the introduction of the 1977 open market policies and trade liberalization, it
was assumed that economic growth would be accelerated and the level of
unemployment would be reduced. The new economic policy was designed to develop
a entrepreneurial class and to revitalize the stagnated economy with a free market
economic engine and the private sector involvement in economic activities in pricing,
foreign trade, direct investment, and exchange rate regimes. With these policies, the
annual GDP growth rate increased up to six percent during 1978-80 and remained
closer to five percent until 1985. Since then, the annual average growth rate calibrated
between five and six percent. With internal shocks from the civil war in the Northern
and Eastern provinces and other political conflicts with extremist groups in the
Southern provinces, the national defense expenditure grew while the macroeconomic
imbalance emerged to reflect negatively in foreign exchange reserves, debt service, and
the balance of payment. Yet, it was expected that poverty would be alleviated, a better
income distribution would be fostered, and unemployment would be reduced like other
East Asian countries. Though the liberalized economy was able to withstand external
and domestic shocks better than the previous regime, the intended policies seemed to
be biased in favor of the affluent class and foreign investment. The annual average
3GDP growth still continued at 4.2 percent during the 1980-90 period and 5.4 percent
during the 1990-94 period. This economic growth encompassed in the increase of
industrial output from 4.6 percent in 1980-90 to 7.5 percent in 1990-94 while the
agricultural sector declined from 2.2 percent in 1980-90 to 2.0 percent in 1990-94.1
Such open and industrial economic policies were accompanied by the
irreversible process of globalization. Globalization has been accelerating since the early
1980s due largely to three global processes:
1) The World Bank and IMF have consistently pushed for structural adjustment
programs to remove economic and trade barriers among nations and to
stabilize the increasing free exchange of monetary flows for a global financial
equilibrium among countries in order to better facilitate world trade and
capital transfers,
2) The democratization of Eastern European countries and the former Soviet
Republics has opened new economic opportunities for those new nations to
engage in the global economy, and
3) The marriage between telephones and computers gave rise to accelerate the
Information Revolution and to share information freely within and among
sectors and countries of the world.
From the interplay of these primary global forces, the private sector (i.e.,
multinational corporations, MNCs) and the civil society (i.e., the NGOs community)
gained an unprecedented prominence over the state sector as the engine of economic
development and global information technology. The emerged role of governments is
to facilitate the private sector development by reforming economic policies and trading
regimes such as NAFTA and the proposed SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Area) under
SAARC.
1 (World Development Report, 1996: Table 11 on p. 208).
4While this paper acknowledges the hindrance and inadequacy of the land
reform, import substitution, and protectionist policies during the 1970-77 period, more
focus is given to explore the claims expressed by the World Bank in terms of poverty
alleviation, employment creation, economic growth with equity, and food security
strategies of Sri Lanka.For this, Section II provides a brief background on the basic
debate between economic growth strategies and human development programs and
makes a comparison with selected countries in Asia. In Section III, a range of
relationships related to economic growth, social equity, and the incidence of poverty is
examined in comparison with other countries to justify the general patterns observed
and reported in the World Bank documents. These relationships are investigated in Sri
Lanka in terms of economic growth, poverty, and unemployment in Section IV. Section
V is devoted to analyzing the policy dilemma in food security and agricultural subsidies
where Sri Lanka’s domestic agricultural and food policy is intricately connected with
the global economy and world market forces.The primary focus is given to domestic
rice production and wheat import policies.The paper concludes in Section VI with a
series of policy dilemmas for Sri Lanka whose globalized economy is in fact closely
linked with agricultural and subsidy policies of other food exporting and producing
countries in Asia and the United States.
II
THE DEBATE IN ASIA:
ECONOMIC GROWTH OR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT?
With a relatively lower GNP per capita income of $540 in 1992, Sri Lanka
maintained a comparatively high human development among Asian countries. The life
expectancy, literacy rate, school enrollment, and other human development indicators
suggest that Sri Lanka has sustained similar or more progressive characteristics of those
of other East Asian countries with much higher GNP per capita level.By increasing its
GNP per capita over 4,250 percent from 1960 to 1992, South Korea’s human
development achievements closely reflect that of Sri Lanka whose GNP per capita
increased only 283 percent (Table 1). It is noted that the life expectancy at birth in Sri
5Lanka was higher than South Korea. Indonesia and Malaysia with their colonial legacy
and Thailand with its Buddhist heritage have attained an impressive economic growth,
but not Sri Lanka with similar colonial and Buddhist history. Beside the cultural
dimension to this development puzzle, the World Bank maintains two major policy
factors that attributed to Sri Lanka’s human development are:
1) A strong push on public provision of health and education services together
with income transfer programs that enabled higher food consumption by the
poor, and
2) A relatively good long-term growth performance, with a real per capita GDP
growth of about 2.5 percent per year on average for the period 1950-93 (the
rate of population growth was less than 2 percent).
Table 1
Growth of GNP Per Capita and Life Expectancy in Selected Countries
Countrv GNP Per Capita 1960 GNP Per Capita 1992 Change* Life Expectancy at
(in current 1960 USS) (in current 1992 US$)   (%) Birth Years (1994)
Indonesia 51 670 1,214 63
Malaysia 273 2,790 922 71
South Korea 156 6,790 4,253 71
SRI LANKA 141 540 283 72
Thailand 96 1,840 1,817 69
Note: *The change in GNP per capita as a percentage from 1960 to 1992.
Sources: Sri Lanka Poverty Assessment, Report No. 13431-CE,  Document of the World
Bank: p. 29. The Life Expectancy data from World Development Report 1996,
(New York: Published by the Oxford University Press for the World Bank),
Table 1, pp. 188-89.
With this framework, the World Bank report, Sri Lanka Poverty Assessment
(1995: p. 29), assesses that the main reason for Sri Lanka to lag behind the economic
growth path of the high-performing East Asian economies is directly related to
“policies” which “were less supportive of economic growth.” The “policies” implied
here are liberalized and open market policies which were seemingly the engine of the
6East Asian economic miracle. In The East Asian Miracle (1993), the World Bank further
argues that the East Asian economies have not only achieved miraculous economic
growth under free market conditions but have also fostered a more equitable income
distribution in the developing world.
With a relatively poor economic performance, Sri Lanka has modeled its policies
and programs after the East Asian miracle to reduce the incidence of poverty, to
increase economic growth, and to secure food requirement in daily calorie intake. This
strategy has been questioned by Amartya Sen, Professor Economics and Philosophy at
Harvard University and the President of the American Economics Association. In his
article in the Scientific American, Professor Sen (1993) argues that a nation can indeed
reach the ends of development (i.e., human development and welfare) by being poor as
Sri Lanka demonstrated. Throughout this century, even before independence in 1948,
Sri Lanka promoted health care, literacy and school programs, and social welfare
services to its population. With public policy actions, Sen maintained in his 1981 article
that Sri Lanka pushed for higher human development. Professor Sen (1981: p. 295)
writes “a country that deserves special attention is Sri Lanka because of its superior
performance in the expectancy of life and its record in poverty removal.” This
observation has further convinced Professor Sen (1983: p. 753) to conclude that:
If the government of a poor developing country is keen to raise the level of
health and the expectation of life, then it would be pretty daft to try to achieve
this through raising its income per head, rather than going directly for these
objectives through public policy and social change, as China and Sri Lanka have
both done.
This highlights some warning signs for those who singularly believe in the
superiority of market mechanism over public policy intervention in economic growth
and human development strategies.It reminds us to use the available economic tools
within a broader framework as other Asian countries selectively utilized in achieving
their development objectives.The remainder of this paper critically examines widely
held notions on free market solutions to poverty alleviation and food security in Sri
Lanka.
7III
THE ENGINE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL EQUITY IN ASIA
Many economists and development professionals believed (and still do) that a
higher economic growth rate would achieve a greater income equality and reduce the
rate of unemployment. With the 1977 economic growth and export-led
industrialization policies, Sri Lanka expected to reach these objectives. In a recent
survey of 114 countries by the United Nations’ International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD) reveals that the level of poverty in some countries persisted or
worsened over the years and the income share of the lowest 20 percent actually
declined or increased only marginally during the 1965-88 period (The State of the World
Rural Poverty, 1992: p. 3 and Chart 1.1). Some observers explained this pattern is a
starting point for greater equality. Similarly, the Kuznets theory suggests that in the
early stages of development the distribution of income becomes worse before it gets
better. Kuznets (1955, 1963, and 1966) observed that the inequality of income rises with
an increase in per capita income up to a certain point before the distribution of income
begins to become more equitable with further increases in per capita income. The
income distribution measured by the Gini coefficient illustrates that there is a pattern to
suggest the validity of Kuznets theory (Table 2). Sri Lanka, for example, has led a path
of increasing income disparity after economic liberalization and has now shown in 1990
that Gini coefficient returned closer to 0.30s (or 30 percent) of the 1969-70 level. In the
global survey by IFAD, The State of the World Rural Poverty (1992: p. 7) report
concludes that overall income distribution “has not always worsened during this
process, because of compensatory shifts of income to middle groups.” Mendis (1992)
concurs that the case of Sri Lanka’s narrowing income gap is associated more with the
introduction of the Janasaviya Poverty Alleviation Program of the late 1980s which
began to transfer funds to the poorest sector rather than the results of economic growth
strategies. It is more likely that public action programs similar to the Million Housing
Program in Sri Lanka, the Saemul Undong Program in South Korea, the Solidarity
Program in Mexico, and the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh may have interplayed
8Table 2
Share of Household Income Distribution and Gini Coefficient in Selected Countries
































































































































Notes: The quintile ratio is calculated by highest to the lowest quintile. The Gini coefficient
shows the given income distribution: the zero Gini coefficient indicates absolute
income equality and the value closer to one indicates absolute inequality.
Sources: The State of the World Rural Poverty: An Inquiry into Its Causes and Consequences,
(1992), edited by Idriss Jazairy, Mohiuddine Alamgir, and Theresa Panuccio, (New
York: Published-for the International Fund for Agricultural Development by the New
York University Press), Appendix Table 5, pp. 402-403. *The 1990 figures are from the
World Development Report 1996, (New York: Published for the World Bank by the
Oxford University Press), Table 5, pp. 196-197.
9positively in the process of poverty reduction.The declining income gap in Malaysia
expressed in the Gini coefficient ratio seems to indicate that economic growth with a
wide range of discriminatory policies on Bumi Putras and non-Bumi Putras seemingly
attributed to the pattern.
The inverted-U curve effect of Kuznets theory has not necessary followed its
historically observed pattern in the contemporary context. The results were rather
mixed. In a comprehensive study of 43 developing countries, Adelman and Morris
(1973: pp. 178-79) conclude that:
The position of the poorest 60 percent typically worsens, both relatively and
absolutely, when an initial spurt of narrowly based dualistic growth is imposed
on an agrarian subsistence economy.The gains of the highest 5 percent are
particularly great in very low income countries where a sharply dualistic
structure is associated with political and economic domination by traditional or
expatriate elites.
This pattern has been further observed by The State of the World Rural Poverty
(1992: pp. 7-9). With the dual sector economy in Sri Lanka, as  highlighted earlier, the
export commercial agriculture has traditionally been more favored over subsistence
agriculture. In addition to this, there is another dichotomy in the emerged post-1977
economy between the highly emphasized manufacturing and textile sector and the less
important agricultural sector.Yet, public policy actions in the form of monetary and
other forms of material transfers (self-housing materials, loan collateral, and income
guarantee programs) could have changed the incidence of poverty across all sectors.
The experience of the high performing Asian economies, including Hong Kong,
South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, has been widely cited as unusually
low and declining levels of income inequality as the rate of per capita income increases.
The World Bank with its The East Asian Miracle (1993) illustrates that these countries’
income inequality as measured by the ratio of the income shares of the richest 20
percent and the poorest 20 percent of the population is among the lowest in developing
countries.But it is difficult to attribute this trend to economic growth per se since
10cultural and situational domestic and international factors may have contributed and
widely varied from one country to another.Liberalized economic policies may have
certainly created a conducive environment to unleash the entrepreneurial zeal in these
economies. To a larger extent, a range of discriminatory policies guided by state
intervention directly impacted the economic growth and income distribution strategies.
The emphasis on primary and secondary education, successful land reform programs,
and state-guided medium and large scale industries were also part of that success.
Above all, most of these East Asian economies, including Taiwan and South Korea in
particular, achieved effective land reform policies and supported domestic agriculture
by improving the rural living standard and subsidizing urban consumers before they
took-off in the industrialization path. Such transformation has evidently forced
necessary social infrastructures for them to maintain a relatively more equal income
distribution. The industrialized strategies of these countries have thus been guided
more by state mechanism than laissez faire trade policies as commonly emphasized and
popularized.
In an extensive study on South Korea, Alice Amsden (1989) finds that the
miraculous success was not necessarily resulted from open market economics but rather
by getting prices “wrong”by state interventionist policies; therefore, making a
generalized conclusion that economic growth induced by free market economic policies
to justify the validity of an imperfect market system is a gross misinterpretation. The
United Nations’ report, The State of World Rural Poverty (1992), concludes that the
effective land reform and the protection for industry at the initial stage led higher
incomes for the peasantry to demand for consumer goods. It further reports (p. 11) that:
Industry was protected by high tariff barriers and wages were able to keep low,
partly thanks to subsidized food prices benefiting the industrial work force.
Contrary to the ‘free market’ doctrine, the state was highly interventionist.
Protected markets in both the Republic of Korea and Taiwan were never
challenged at any forum.
It is then more accurate to suggest that a
driven, are elements of the explanation in the
host of policies, both market- and state-
development puzzle in the East Asian
11miracle. Although, a sound macroeconomic management is a very common feature
among these countries, it does not necessarily attribute solely to free market policies.
Yet, the World Bank group naturally supports the notion that economic growth induced
by free market is most important explanation according to The East Asian Miracle
(1993) and Stanley Fisher (1993).
IV
THE INCIDENCE OF POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN SRI LANKA
In Sri Lanka, the growth of output over the period of 1965-88 has neither brought
about a significant improvement in the income share of the lowest 20 percent nor an
overall reduction in the percentage of rural population below the poverty line. Among
many countries, Sri Lanka has been singled out as the case where rural poverty has
worsened between the mid-1960s and the 1980s. The State of the World Rural Poverty
(1992) reveals that the increase of rural poverty among 114 countries surveyed, the level
of Sri Lanka’s poverty in headcount ratio changed from 13 percent in 1965 to 46 percent
in 1988, an increase of 254 percent which ranked the highest among all countries
surveyed. The number of rural poor rose from 1,163,OOO in 1965 to 6,101,OOO  in 1988.
Despite its GNP per capita annual growth at three percent, the rural population below
the poverty line in Sri Lanka has increased over 250 percent during the same time
period (Table 3).
The World Bank statistics indicate that the incident of poverty as a measure of
headcount index shows that the level of poverty declined from 40.6 percent in 1985-85
to 35.3 percent in 1990-91 (Table 4). Here, the definitional, methodological, and
technical measurements should certainly be noted as they varied between the 1992
United Nations’ State of the World Rural Poverty survey and the 1995 World Bank
report on Sri Lanka Poverty Assessment. The World Bank statistics, based on
consumption data, demonstrate that both sectoral and country-wide absolute poverty
over the two surveys has in fact declined (Table 4). The Bank report, Sri Lanka Poverty
12Table 3
Growth of GNP Per Capita and Changes in the Incidence of Rural Poverty for
Selected Countries, 1965-88
Countrv GNP Per Capita Percentage of Rural Population
Annual Growth Rate Below Povertv Line
1965-88 (percent)                                      1965     1985        %Increase*
Bangladesh 0.4 83 86 4
China 5.4 6 14 133
Ecuador 3.1 65 65 0
Egypt                                      3.6 17 25 47
Indonesia 4.3 47 27 -43
Malaysia 4.0 59 22 -63
SRI LANKA 3.0 13 46 254
Tanzania -0.5 65 60 -8
Thailand 4.0 56 43 -23
Note: *The percentage increase is calculated between 1965 and 1988.
Source: The State of the World Rural Povertv: An Inauiry into Its Causes and
c (1992), Consequences,       edited by Idriss Jazairy, Mohiuddine Alamgir, and
Theresa Panuccio, (New York: Published for the International Fund for
Agricultural Development by the New York University Press), Table 2.2, p. 7.
Table4
Population Shares, Mean Consumption, Poverty Line, and Gini Coefficient in Rural,
Urban, and Estate Sectors in Sri Lanka, 1998-86 and 1990-91
Survev Year Rural Urban Estate Sri Lanka
1985-86
Population share (%) 72.5 20.8 6.7 100
Mean consumption* 708.3 1038.5 763.7 780.3
Poverty (headcount Index)** 45.5 26.8 30.9 40.6
Gini coefficient (Oh) 29.9 35.7 24.5 32.0
1990-91
Population share (%) 72.5 20.9 6.6 100
Mean consumption* 743.6 990.1 749.9 795.9
Poverty (headcount Index)** 38.1 28.4 27.5 35.3
Gini coefficient (%) 27.6 35.4 20.2 29.7
Notes: *Mean consumption prices at 1990-91 level in Sri Lankan Rs. per person per
month.**Poverty measure was at the level of Rs. 565.4 per person per month.
The data exclude the North and East provinces and refer to the first three
rounds of the 1990-91 survey and same months of the 1985-86 survey.
Source: World Bank, Sri Lanka Poverty Assessment, Report No. 13431-CE:  Table 1.4 on
p. 7, Table 1.5 on p. 8, and Annex 2 on pp. 86-94.
13Assessment (1995: p. 8) which excludes the war-toned North and East provinces in the
calculation due to lack of data, highlights that:
There was a significant improvement in the nationwide Gini coefficient of
consumption, from 32.0 in 1985-86 to 29.7 in 1990-91. The modest increase in
consumption per capita and the improvement in distribution combined to
produce a significant decline in poverty over this particular five-year period.
The World Bank then provides a possible explanation for this decline by citing an
article by Datt and Ravallion (1992) which attributes to “growth and redistribution
components.”In the final analysis, the Bank report (1995: p. 9) asserts that “this
intuitive interpretation is confirmed by formal discomposition of the changes in poverty
in the 1985-86 to 1990-91 period into a growth component and a redistribution
component, . . . .”It seems that the Bank analysis has completely ignored the obvious
reason for such decline and misinterpreted the consumption data. It should have
included the relevancy of the Janasaviya Poverty Alleviation Program which has
transferred massive fund outflows to the rural poor for consumption (Janasavipath)
needs which was more than 50 percent of the total allocation per household between the
two survey periods.Public financing for household consumption in the rural sector
was more apparent than the estate and urban sectors because Janasaviya had been
targeted for the rural poor. During this period, the rural mean consumption per month
increased from Rs. 708 in 1985-86 to Rs. 744 in 1990-91 while the mean consumption in
the urban and estate sectors declined (Table 4). In the rural sector, the Gini coefficient
narrowed its gap from 29.9 percent in 1985-86 to 27.6 percent in 1990-91. The closing
gap in the estate sector Gini coefficient may have been associated with the increases in
salary and off-estate employment opportunities.A slight decline in population in
estates was shown as there was a slight gain in the share of the urban population.
The World Bank report on Sri Lanka Poverty Assessment (1995) further
emphasizes the declining trend of the incidence of poverty as measured by the
headcount index for the reference poverty line of Rs. 565 in the rural sector (38 percent),
followed by the urban sector (28 percent), and the estate sector (27 percent). The overall
14incidence of poverty in Sri Lanka was reported to decline from 40.6 percent in 1985-86
to 35.3 percent in 1991-91 (Table 4). The reason for the declining poverty, which was
uneven for rural, estate, and urban areas, is cited by the Bank report (1995: p. 9):
The uneven decline in poverty by place of residence between the two survey
periods can be ‘explained’ by the different evolution of per capita consumption
and Gini coefficients for the three residence categories. For rural residents, there
was an increase in per capita consumption in constant prices between the two
survey periods, of about 5 percent, and also an improvement of more than two
points in the Gini coefficient of consumption. For urban residents, by contrast,
there was a decline of near 5 percent in per capita consumption, and hardly any
change in the Gini coefficient; a combination that led to an increase in urban
poverty between the two survey periods.For estate residents, there was a 2
percent decline in per capita consumption, but this was more than compensated
(in relation to its impact on poverty) by a very large improvement in the Gini
coefficient, of over four points.
\ The Bank’s analysis seems to highlight the decline in poverty and income
inequality associated more with economic growth than the impact of public policy
action which is related to the consumption-driven Janasavipaths to the rural poor. This
massive nationwide Poverty Alleviation Program, which was ignored in the Bank’s
analysis, appears to be a more probable explanation than the growth-driven
interpretation.Even if the level of economic growth were a factor, it was not equally
distributed among the rural poor where the growth linkages could not be reached to the
bottom and every corner of the country. A disaggregated statistical analysis between
the impact of Janasaviya and the result of economic growth in per capita output may
shed more light to understand this than “intuitive” interpretation. Until then, a firm
conclusion based on possibly unreliable consumption data is premature and dangerous
in future policy formulation and implementation.
Furthermore, even if we are convinced that economic performance is conducive
to reducing the level of poverty and income disparity, the level of unemployment
remained consistently unchanged over the past 40 years. There is still youth unrest and
political conflicts which may be associated with high unemployment, especially among
the educated and rural youth population.This has been exacerbated by the clearly
divided perception and social psychology created by excessive concessions and
15incentives given to the rich and foreign investors while reducing services to the poor in
health, education, food subsidies, and other social welfare programs. Beyond human
psychology, the educated and frustrated youth find no opportunities with the growth of
the economy. This may have attributed to a wide range of reasons including the
prevailing educational system, the continuing non-alignment with labor market needs,
and the less proficiency in English language in order to be productively employed in
the private sector.But the existing unemployment rate has calibrated around 14-15
percent on the average over the past 50 years. The data in Table 5 demonstrates that the
rate of unemployment has in fact slightly declined soon after the introduction of
liberalized trade policies from 15.3 percent in 1980-81 to 14.4 percent in 1990 but the
lowest level of 13 percent in the 1960s and 1970s was not achieved.2 The reduction in
unemployment soon after the open market economy is also associated with
employment opportunities in the Middle East and Persian Gulf countries and the
removal of foreign exchange control.
Yet, a significant decline in the labor force participation rate (item 6 in Table 5)
and in the ratio of employed to the total population (item 8 in Table 5) from 1953 to 1963
suggests a correlation with “little economic growth” according to the Bank’s analysis
(Sri Lanka Poverty Assessment, 1995: p. 13). The economic rationale for this analysis
was based on the annual growth of private per capita consumption. The Sri Lanka
Poverty Assessment (1995: p. 6) report further “implies that there must have been a
very significant decline in consumption poverty incidence in Sri Lanka in the 1953-85
period.”This assertion is relied on the trends of private consumption per capita and
does not represent a validity that higher per capita consumption is associated with
“economic growth.”After the 1977 trade liberalization, there has been a relatively
higher annual economic growth as well as an increasingly high per capita consumption
(Table 6). Here, the consumption-led economic growth is not clearly evident for several
reasons:
%I Sri Lanka, like any other developing country, the employment data can be deceiving, especially in the
rural and estate sector labor markets. For a different perspective, it must be noted that the U.S.
unemployment statistics remain contradictory and controversial.
16the “informal” economy, are difficult to capture accurately in statistical
analysis, yet they exist (Burton, 1992).
The open market economy has certainly provided more opportunities for those
semi-employed and unskilled workers to be gainfully employed in the Middle East and
to remit income without foreign exchange control. Even though, the growth of private
consumption reflects a consistent relationship between the consumption pattern and
gross domestic production (GDP), there exists a pattern between increasing
consumption and greater imports with higher prices under the liberalized market
policies. The growth of GDP and the increased consumption per capita have not yet
generated more employment opportunities in the domestic economy as claimed to be
accompanied by with free market growth strategies. If there were no employment
opportunities abroad, the apparent unemployment rate could have, for example,
increased beyond the 14.1 percent level in 1985-86 and the share of private consumption
as a percentage of GDP could have also declined below the 77.9 percent level in 1985 (cf.
Tables 5 and 6). From this perspective, trade liberalization has indeed provided the
opportunity to mobilize the domestic labor markets and to take advantage of
employment markets abroad.Otherwise, the unemployment rate could have been
much higher.
Historically, the East Asian miracle was achieved in an environment where direct
investment inflow and export market opportunities were sufficiently available to
employ more people domestically. Between 1951 and 1965, according to The State of
the World Rural Poverty (1992: p. 11), Taiwan received $1.5 billion in economic aid from
the Untied States and South Korea received $6 billion between 1945 and 1978. Over 80
percent of South Korea’s imports in the 1950s were financed by U.S. assistance. The
U.S. aid helped to invest heavily in transportation facilities, communication network,
educational and student exchange programs, and health care delivery systems. The
same economic, cultural, and market conditions were not prevailing for contemporary
Sri Lanka to capture the opportunities in the global marketplace. The expansion of
world trade from 1963-73 increased at an annual rate of 8.5 percent and this was not
18sustaining in the global marketplace for Sri Lanka in the 1980s and 1990s. With rapid
globalization, the export oriented textile and clothing industry in Sri Lanka needed to
compete with lower cost of production countries of India, Vietnam, Cambodia, and
China. The quota under the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) fluctuates according to
global politics where trade and military strategic interests lie in favor of the importing
countries, especially the Untied States (World Develoument Report, 1990). Over the
past few years, the protectionist sentiments have also increased in other OECD
countries despite the fact that the Uruguay Round and GATT attempted to do
otherwise. In addition, Sri Lanka’s comparative advantage over India’s new liberalized
economic policies is also challenged and questioned as India, with over 900 million
consumers, has become more attractive to foreign investors and marketers than the
neighboring island-economy of 18 million people whose disadvantage has further been
Table 6
Trends in Private Consumption Per Capita, 1953-93
1953 m 1970 1977 1979 1985
Ratio of private
consumption/GDP (Oh) 77.8 72.7 72.3 73.3 77.1 77.9
Private consumption per
capita (current prices)* 37 42 66 160 233 666
Consumer Price Index
(CPI 1985 = 100) 18.1 19.4 24.6 36.2 45.0 100
Private consumption
per capita (1985 prices)** 204 216 269 442 518 666







Notes: *Current prices, per month, in Rs. **1985 prices deflated by CPI, per month, in
RS.
Source: World Bank, (1995), Sri Lanka Povertv Assessment, Report No. 13431-CE:  Table
1.2 on p. 4.
19aggravated by the 14-year old, continuing ethnic war and political instability as a
potential market.Yet, its strategic location in the South Asian region as well as the
transit port between East and West still serves as an attraction for investment, though, it
isunderutilized.
V
FOOD SECURITY, AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
As it was in the past, the labor intensive agricultural sector is still the most
important sector in the economy. It employed 48 percent of the labor force in 1990 (52
percent in 1980) and contributed 24 percent to GDP in 1994 (28 percent in  1980).3 The
decline in labor force and GDP does not necessarily suggest a transfer of rural surplus
labor to the urban industrialized sector with the introduction of the open market
policies and the establishment of free trade zones in Colombo and its vicinity. The
urban population remained relatively unchanged at 22 percent for several decades.
This is a salient feature of Sri Lanka compared to other East Asian economies. In the
industrialized East Asia, the composition of agricultural and industrial sectors in the
GDP has changed rapidly as the urban population increased (Mendis, 1995: Figure 3 on
p. 15). For over two decades of industrialization push, Sri Lanka’s rural population
structurally remained at the same rate as it was 50 years ago.
The land use area in cropland has, however, increased from 10 percent in 1980 to
29 percent in1993. 4 The distribution of cropland by the tree crops plantation sector of
tea, rubber, and coconut was 54 percent and the nonplantation sector, which primarily
includes rice-paddy cultivation, was 25 percent in 1989-91. Other crops such as
sugarcane, onion, potatoes, chilies, and maize for which Sri Lanka is a net importer was
six percent while the minor tree crops (like cinnamon and cardamom) for export was 12
percent. The other remaining crops for domestic consumption was four percent. Due
in part to a series of Land Reform Legislation, Sri Lankan agriculture can be
3The latest available data, World DeveloDment   Report 1996, Table 4 on p. 194 andTable12onp.210.
4The latest available data, World DeveloDment   ReDort 1996: Table 9 on p.204
20characterized as smallholding. There is no land over 50 acres (20 hectare) owned by a
family. According to 1982 Agricultural Census, about 94 percent of holdings were
under five acres and they occupied 73 percent of the total paddy lands.5 Other lands
over 50 acres were owned by the government. The land ownership and property rights
are still major issues in agriculture.6 Under the accelerated Mahaveli River
Development Program, the government has begun to distribute lands to farmers. By
1992, over 144,000 families had been settled in 105 schemes under this Program. Every
family was entitled to have a parcel of irrigatable land for rice cultivation and highland
for other crops (Gunatilleke, 1992). The government has also introduced schemes to
lease out land to private farmers and private entrepreneurs.
With this brief background, as emphasized earlier, it must be reminded that Sri
Lanka had a long-standing policy in pursuing a rice self-sufficiency strategy. The
consecutive post-colonial governments have encouraged farmers to devote irrigated
land for rice cultivation. In ancient Sri Lanka, the rice cultivation was the model of
indigenous development where the Tank (reservoir for irrigation) and the Dagaba
(Buddhist temple for moral and spiritual development) were considered the other two-
pillars of humandevelopment.7For many decades, the government provided land for
landless farmers under the 1935 Land Development Ordinance. Other legislation was
later added to govern the distribution of small holdings to landless farmers. The
Agrarian Act of 1979, which made it illegal for farmers to grow crops other than rice in
paddy land, was amended at the recommendation of the World Bank in 1991 in order to
make it competitive to use the land for other profitable crops such as vegetables and
fruits for export and domestic markets.
5This is the most recent census on agriculture in Sri Lanka.
%t is estimated that the government owns about 82 percent of all land and about 45 percent of the total
cropland  in the country.
7The ancient irrigation technology in Sri Lanka is well noted. The International Irrigation Management
Institute (IIMI), a global institution as part of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural
Research (CGIAR), headquarters in Sri Lanka.
21With these guiding strategies, Sri Lanka has arrived at nearer self-sufficiency in
rice and has imported only about 10 percent of its total domestic consumption. The
import rice at the free trade import parity prices in the world market are generally
lower than the domestic prices at the wholesale and retail levels. It is, therefore, argued
by the World Bank that the rice self-sufficiency policy with import restrictions “benefits
paddy producers”and “hurts rice consumers” (Sri Lanka Poverty Assessment, 1995: p.
47). The dominant free trade theory of comparative advantage advocated by the World
Bank has laid the foundation that the global market forces should be allowed to operate
in order to maximize the consumer welfare (not necessarily small producers). One way
to achieve this is to remove the “restrictions on rice imports (which) tend to raise
domestic prices of rice.”The Bank’s Sri Lanka Poverty Assessment (1995: pp. 47-48)
report hence argues that the effects of import protection are “quite damaging to those
among the poor who are not paddy producers”and “more poor households are being
‘taxed’ by the protection. Only about 5 percent of poor households would be negatively
affected by a reduction of rice protection.”Under this proposed World Bank free
agricultural trade regime, it is recommended that “all quantitative import restrictions
and the minimum wholesale price should be eliminated” (p. 48). It further recommends
that “these reforms should be accompanied by government assistance to rice producers
to help them increase their productivity in rice production and to assist them in
diversifying into other crops and livestock products” (p. 48). In facilitating this
domestic economic alignment with global market forces, there seems to be potential
negative impact directly on local producers and consumers and indirectly on the
environment from two fronts:
1) Domestic rice production, which has been subsidized by inputs such as seed,
irrigation, and fertilizer, is not efficient enough to compete with low cost
imported rice; therefore, it is advantageous for Sri Lanka to divert rice land
into other export crops.If they were to increase the productivity of rice,
farmers would have to use more fertilizer, chemicals, high yielding varieties
(HYVs),  and other inputs which are costly.
222) The government involvement in rice marketing (and import as well) through
the Food Commissioners Department (FCD) and the Cooperative Wholesales
Establishment (CWE) prevents market forces to operate; therefore, these
importing and distributing institutions should be eliminated and allow private
companies to engage in these economic activities.
While the privatization strategy may create a more economic efficiency through
private competition than the government monopoly, the rice diversification strategy for
value-added export crops may lead to a greater economic, social, political,
environmental, and cultural fallout than the anticipated comparative economic gains.
Structurally, Sri Lanka’s rural farming communities are still traditionally and
ecologically linked to rice lands and to the indigenous farming culture. The millennia-
old, multi-facedly integrated rice sector is an environmentally-tested sustainable system
as is the case for the centuries-old export-led plantation sector which is considered as
the life-blood of the foreign exchange earner and the linkage to the global economy.
The exposure to international competition and privatization effort of the plantation
sector is a sensible strategy; whereas, the indigenous rice sector is concerned, an
operative framework for market economics to work domestically would enhance the
efficiency and productivity. The element of subsidies to domestic agriculture and its
interplay with the international rice economy is further discussed below to address the
policy dilemma for Sri Lanka within the globalized and subsidized rice economy.
Along with rice, other food import restrictions in quota have recently been
eliminated for several important food commodities. It is recommended that
quantitative import restrictions in addition to rice should be eliminated for wheat (and
wheat flour), sugar, and milk. The importation of wheat and wheat flour is different
from rice because Sri Lanka does not produce wheat but a monopolistic private firm
(called PRIMA, located in the eastern coastal town of Trincomalee) processes imported
wheat into flour which is distributed by CWE. Unlike rice, the import of wheat does
not hurt domestic farmers directly. But any restrictions on wheat import would
increase demand for rice consumption and thus its prices. As a net importer of rice,
23however, the impact on the increase in rice price may not occur as long as the
restrictions on rice are removed or relaxed as well as wheat. Since there prevails a
range of economic and political pressures derived from relatively low import prices of
rice at the world market level and the increasing domestic demand for wheat and other
food commodities, Sri Lanka has to deal with a dilemma as to whether domestic rice
production should be protected (absolutely or selectively) or allow the free market
mechanism to find its way in order to take benefits from the comparative advantage for
the welfare of consumers.
In the past, the consecutive governments have explicitly been driven by
achieving the rice self-sufficiency objective with heavy public investment in the
Mahaveli River diversification and irrigation schemes as well as new farmer
colonization projects. Symbolically, Sri Lanka a few years ago exported a shipment of
rice to East Africa. It seems unwise for Sri Lanka to change the potential of being a net
exporter of rice in the foreseeable future.Recently, the International Rice Research
Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines introduced a newer HYV of rice to further enhance
rice productivity in the southern part of the country. 8 Yet, Sri Lanka’s food security is
closely linked to global markets and to the American PL 480 program for wheat.
Therefore, the pressure from the global market forces to open up the domestic
agricultural market seems inevitable. But, diverting rice land to other export crops for a
short-term comparative advantage (unlike industrial goods) may not be the long-term
solution to the food security situation in Sri Lanka.
Another World Bank report, Sri Lanka Nonplantation Crop Sector Policy
Alternatives (1996: p. i), concludes that:
*It should be noted, however, that the Green Revolution has accompanied with negative externalities to
small rice farmers with high input intensity at higher prices and environmental degradation and public
health concerns. Many farmer organizations are being encouraged to cultivate rice organically. Some
evidence suggests that organic rice cultivators could produce yield as same level as the non-organic
farming with low cost. Furthermore, the IRRl laboratory experiments in the Philippines show that rice
productivity of HYV is on decline or stagnated in the long run. Therefore, a push for a second Green
Revolution should be advanced with caution given the environmental and public health issues related to
high input intensity.
24Overall, Sri Lanka currently shows no comparative advantage in production in
rice or OFC (Other Food Commodities) in either major or minor, irrigated or
rainfed agriculture.Domestic production is much more costly than imports.
Obviously, with appropriate amendment in the incentive structure for farmers
and improvement in productivity, this will change. While not all rice production
is noncompetitive with imports, a large amount is.
The main argument here indicates that large subsidies to irrigation and rice-
paddy would cost the tax payers and the government in transfer of funds to benefit rice
farmers at the expense of consumers.Rice farmers are in fact, according the Bank’s
analysis, “low-value crop” producers and rice consumers have to pay 30 percent more
than world market prices of rice costing about $125 million per year for the national
treasury. In sum, the Bank report concludes that the cost of supporting non-competitive
domestic rice production is close to five percent of GDP; therefore, the removal of
subsidies and the reduction in import tariffs on rice and other OFCs should be
established for the free market to operate in order to benefit consumers, not rice
producers. According to Sri Lanka Nonplantation Crop Sector Policy Alternatives
(1996:p. ii), this provides rice farmers:
The opportunity to phase into production of higher valued export crops. With a
decline in rice prices, consumers will benefit, as will most small farmers because
they consume more rice than they produce.
This consumer-driven supply-side economics may achieve the desired policy
goals by the increase in rice import to meet the local demand at low world market
prices. In Figure 1, Chart A illustrates this point that the global market price of rice at
Pg which is lower than Sri Lanka’s domestic price at Ps in Chart B. With a lower price,
the quantity of domestic consumption would increase from Qs to Qs2 by raising
consumer welfare. At the same time, this would be a disincentive to domestic rice
farmers and the quantify of domestic rice production would decrease to the level at Qs3
from Qs. Such a strategy of shifting of farming from “low-value rice” to “high-value
export crops”would work under this linear economic theory. Yet, the anticipated
danger in this policy prescription comes from two sides:
25farmers find competitive high-value crops? How long will that take? How
long can they maintain that comparative advantage? And, are they
ecologically sustainable in Sri Lanka?
In a policy blue-print titled Sri Lanka in the Year 2000: An Agenda for Action
(1996: p. 19), the World Bank strongly recommends to diversify those rice lands into
“higher value-added crops, in particular fruits and vegetables.” To facilitate this
scheme, it further recommends an agricultural land market reform whereby farmers are
given property rights so that they could buy and sell their lands in an open market.
Since the government owns closer to 50 percent of agricultural lands, the transfer of
land to private ownership under the 1991 Agrarian Services Act would foster a fair land
market system and would unleash individual enterprenuership. The underlying
purpose of this scheme is, however, not to alleviate poverty among landless and
marginalized small farmers, but rather to facilitate private companies and large
businesses to operate for export-led agricultural crops when the land markets emerge
from the complex and complicated land tenure and ownership system. This will
especially be true in the Mahaveli resettlement areas in the dry zone. Although the
individual property and market system of land ownership are better served for small
farmers than the government ownership, there still exists the same questions related to
the comparative advantage of these corps over rice cultivation which need to be
resolved. The validity of this policy recommendation may fade away as if Sri Lanka
begins to import low priced fruits and vegetables from neighboring Asian countries
whose government intervention in a form of subsidies and other incentives is more
favorable to their export-oriented agricultural sector.The earlier strategies for self-
sufficiency which were implemented in rice production with massive public investment
in irrigation network by the World Bank and other donor agencies may resonate the
similar argument made here.Yet, the changing nature of globalized market needs
presents Sri Lanka with a policy challenge ahead.
One may still ponder as to whether a small agricultural nation like Sri Lanka
would in absolute terms benefit from the agricultural globalization as opposed to the
27comparative advantage shown in industrial and technological globalization. A policy
driven by global economics in agricultural crops compared to industrial goods seems to
be illusive, especially when Sri Lanka is closer to self-sufficiency in rice. More
importantly, when protectionist policies and subsidized agriculture prevail in exporting
countries with oligopolistic world agricultural system (with subsidy, price fixing, and
other market manipulations), how could Sri Lanka expect to benefit from comparative
7advantage in the process of globalization. Under the Uruguay Rounds and GATT
negotiations,agriculture has been widely debated with its complexities in US
agriculture and the Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) with subsidies. Yet,
an aggressive shift from rice farming to higher value crops appeared to be an attractive
alternative based on neo-classical economics reasoning and logic but such a policy
option should be considered within a larger framework of national interest and the
nature of subsidies and protectionist agricultural policies of rice (and wheat) in
exporting countries.When and if those countries’ rice producers are subsidized, the
market prices at the world market have already been distorted. The global rice market
price, shown in Chart A in Figure 1 for example, is not necessarily the free market price.
A various form of subsidies and other indirect assistance is provided to American and
Thai rice farmers for political and economic reasons. When Sri Lanka attempts to
formulate a domestic agricultural policy based purely on free market economics and the
world market rice prices which are inherently distorted, could the anticipated result be
beneficial to domestic small farmers as well as to consumers in Sri Lanka? In the midst
of rapid globalization, any strategic changes related to the land-based agricultural
system, which is immobile relative to other form of economic activities and the factors
to production, should carefully be considered only if and when the world market prices
are completely free of any intervention and distortion in a form of subsidies or other
quantitative and qualitative restrictions.
With the reduction of domestic subsidies and increasing input prices, like
fertilizer, seeds, and chemicals, the poor farmers could not afford to sustain their
farming livelihoods. A very important finding in the World Bank’s Nonplantation Crop
28number of unemployed rural farmers who could not even afford import with their off-
farm income? With the structural nature of trade relations between Sri Lanka and the
US and other global food exporters, it is a policy dilemma for Sri Lanka. The forces of
economic globalization, which are accepted and implemented without considering the
national security needs at the perceived benefits of global economics, have not thus far
created a market environment to achieve the desired goal: to alleviate poverty and
reduce unemployment.
The national food assistance programs, which are financed by domestic and
external sources, are used as important means of alleviating poverty among the poor.
During the early years of the post independent Sri Lanka, the consecutive governments
maintained subsidies. After the trade liberalization, governments took steps to reduce
the share of the national expenditure on subsidies to reduce hunger, malnutrition, and
poverty simultaneously.A host of other safety nets in a form of the Janasaviya Poverty
Alleviation Program, the Food Stamp Program for the Poor, the Mid-Day Meal Program
for School Children, and other public assistance programs including the assistance to
displaced and refugee population in the civil conflict is a potion of national budget. In
1992, the fiscal cost of such transfers consisted of about two percent of  GDP.‘0 A
reduction in all programs is recommended by the World Bank. The 1994 elected
government attempted to improve the targeting of these programs to the poor and
consolidated the food stamp, mid-day meal, and the Janasaviya program into a more
effective program called Samurdhi or Prosperity.
The public transfer of money in the form of Samurdhi programs or agricultural
subsidies to the poor and rural farmers has two intrinsic problems: targeting and
efficiency. While targeting demands an effective administrative mechanism to deliver
them efficiently, the subsidies tend to distort the free market mechanism. Both are
evident in Sri Lanka. Under the Janasaviya Program, non-poor and politically-favored
recipients have benefited.The Samurdhi Program is targeted to about 1.2 million
l@I-~e safety nets and other transfer programs including wheat flour and fertilizer subsidies come to 3.5
percent of GDP.
30households (about 30 percent) compared to about 1.5 million households who had
received food stamps and mid-day meal coupons.The subsidies on wheat and wheat
flour as well as fertilizer seem to favor the rich who could afford them in the open
market. The incident of the wheat flour subsidy demonstrates this pattern (Table 7).
Within the South Asian region, Sri Lanka has the highest per capital expenditure
on food subsidies in 1985 (Table 8). Among other countries, Sri Lanka’s expenditure on
subsidies is relatively low. Egypt, as one of the largest recipients of international food
aid from the United States, has the highest per capita expenditure on subsidies. Mexico
ranks relatively high as well (Table 8). In terms of the share of the total government
expenditure, the cost of subsidies varies from one country to another (Table 9). Despite
its budgetary constraints, Sri Lanka has still maintained relatively high outlays of
subsidy expenditure at 1.16 percent of GDP compared to its South Asian neighbors of
India (0.36 percent), Bangladesh (0.63 percent), and Pakistan (0.48 percent) in 1985
(Table 9).
Table 7
Incidence of the Wheat Flour Subsidy in 1995











Source: World Bank, Sri Lanka in the Year 2000: An Agenda for Action, (1996), Report
No. 15455, Joint Sri Lankan  and World Bank Study, March 14, p. 35. This is
based on the Household Expenditure Survey Census in Sri Lanka.
31Table 9
Government Expenditures on Explicit Food Subsidies as Percentage of Total
Government Expenditure and Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Country Year
Expenditure
% of Total Gov. Exu. % of GDP
Bangladesh 1985 3.78 0.63
Brazil 1985 1.65 0.16
Colombia 1982 0.04 0.01
Egypt 1985 15.58 6.64
India 1985 2.19 0.36
Mexico 1984 2.59 0.63
Morocco 1985 7.91 2.33
Pakistan 1985 4.11 0.48
SRI LANKA 1985 2.77 1.16
Zambia 1982 1.21 0.44
Notes: Subsidies include both targeted and general subsidies.
Source: Cornia, A. G., Richard Jolly, and F. Stewart, eds., (1987), Adjustment With a
Human Face, Volumes 1 and 2, (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
United Nations’ Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) Report, Technical
Background Documents (Vol. 3,1996: p. 30), prepared for the 1996 World Food Summit,
highlights the consequences of Structural Adjustment Programs:
Cuts in social expenditure and service have affected the poor, who are the most
dependent on public support, and economic adjustments have resulted in
increases in unemployment and in a decline in incomes for many; this is bad
news for the hungry, given the close relationship between poverty and hunger.
In Sri Lanka, while the decline in subsidies on food commodities directly impacts
the poor, there also exists no food shortage due to import liberalization policies. Yet,
higher open market prices hurt rural and urban consumers but help farmers to produce
more food.
33VI
GLOCALIZATION: A POLICY DILEMMA FOR SRI LANKA
The development issues and food security problems in Sri Lanka are more
complex and complicated than they appeared to outside observers. Sri Lanka
represents a mix of a first wave (agricultural), second wave (industrialized), and third
wave (information) nation that is attempting to adapt into the rapidly changing global
economy. Policy-elites, who live on the virtual realities of “informatized” world,
worked with the industrialized framework of East Asia, yet the beneficiaries of these
policies are still living in the first wave of agricultural rural society which is structurally
rigid for cultural and socio-ethnic reasons. The policy gap between policy
implementation and impacted assessment on recipients is enormous. Income between
rich and poor is also widening, environmental degradation is rising especially in urban
centers, and political stabilization is costing both in financial and human terms.
The rapid globalization of world trade and open market policies is being
painfully interfaced with local economy while creating a set of moral, human, social,
and ecological externalities.This interplay of global forces at local communities is
called “glocalization,” not globalization.The introduction of liberalized trade policies
of 1977 with corrective measures of poverty alleviation programs -- Janasaviya and
Samurthi --that followed to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor apparently
have not taken effect to validate the Kuznets U-curve. The liberalized policies have in
fact accelerated the economic growth and have somewhat deterred the internal and
external shocks from the ethnic war and the vagaries of the international economy. The
paradox of policy alternatives prescribed by the World Bank and other donor agencies
is that the very objectives they seek to maximize have seemingly been overshadowed by
the expected result of reducing poverty and promoting sustainable development at the
“glocalization”  process.
Overall, the experience suggests that free market economics could sustain better
development objective for the majority of peoplethan the nationalistic inward-looking
policies pursued by the government prior to 1977.The land reforms, the nationalization
34efforts of plantation sector, and the government intervention in market have also had
detrimental impact on the poor even though the ideological arguments on the surface
convinced policymakers in favor of the poor. The post 1977 policies were formulated
with the shift of paradigm in development thinking and the influence of economic
growth strategies of the four East Asian Tigers of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea,
and Taiwan.Without a careful analysis of historical linkages and unique cultural
framework of these Four Tigers and Baby Tigers of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
and Thailand, Sri Lankan policymakers have indiscriminately replicated several sets of
macroeconomic policy instruments which fully integrated the local economy into the
global trading system. The liberalized economy has created new opportunities for some
people but alienated many. The process of globalization is not fully compatible with
the structural rigidities which are intrinsically interwoven with cultural, religious, and
traditional values of the rural economy where more than 75 percent of the people live
and work. Any attempt to disrupt the rural social infrastructure and the agro-ecological
farming system would be counterproductive and seemed to have displaced many
people and their sustainable livelihoods.The expected social costs and ecological
externalities associated with drastic economic transformation by policy intervention
without a battery of sensitivity analysis based on social and ecological accounting
would be dangerous. The root causes of ethnic war in the North and East provinces as
well as youth uprisings in the South and elsewhere in the country may be associated
with the single-minded economic policy-drive without considering the impact on the
poor and the unemployed. The fragile ecological system in the island would also react
to the consequences of policy imperatives.
Sri Lanka, for example, has recently been singled out as having the world’s
highest suicide rate among farmers (who take chemical, fertilizer, and pesticides as
poison) due to a host of economic and social reasons. It is reported that the total
number of deaths by suicide is higher than the total number of human lives lost in the
ethnic civil warbetween the 1983-96 period which is roughly estimated to be more than
55, 000 people.This does not imply that the process of glocalization is responsible
35directly for the suicidal rate. But, we should not exclude this externality in the
economic analysis. An analysis of sociological and psychological impact on the poor is
an important element in economics because the way of economic livelihoods of the poor
and the disadvantaged is closely related to public health, social, and environmental
issues. The impact on such issues should, therefore, be fully integrated in economic
analysis and policy formulation. Therefore, public policy intended for an expected
economic growth objective should not underscore the potential costs resulting from
social unrest and ecological disasters as we witness among Tigers of East and Southeast
Asia where employee rights and human freedom are violated and environmental
degradation has made urban living uninhabitable in population clusters of major cities,
especially Seoul and Taipei, in East Asia.
The lessons are becoming clearer for Sri Lanka to emulate the best of market
economics and statecraft like some other Asian Tiger economies did (similar to that of
Singapore) in order to maximize its national interest in a system of multi-ethnic
democratic governance while preserving the cultural identity and minimizing negative
externalities related to the environment, labor standard, social cost, and public health
issues. These linkages are becoming increasingly important in analytical framework of
neoclassical economic theory which drives the cult-like economic growth objective as a
fashionable solution these days. Economic growth is indeed a key element of the
irreversible globalization process which transforms our individual, family, and
community lives with glocalization. Yet, the deficiencies of economic theory must be
recognized by recurring negative evidence of glocalization and thus complemented
with an analysis of non-economic factors which are intricately associated with the
quality of life and human security at the individual level. Most often, the best things in
economic life come paradoxically with non-economic factors. Descriptive and
predictive failures in economic theory should, therefore, be improved with a sensitivity
analysis of evidence and impact assessment in policy analysis and formulation. Market
economics has shown that it does not itself take care of negative externalities of
36economic growth. A well functioning statecraft is indeed essential as guidance for Sri
Lanka as it was the case for Four Tigers of East Asia, especially Japan and Singapore.
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